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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses Australia’s 1980s shift to a new accumulation strategy of ‘international 
competitiveness’ to examine the role of failure in shaping state strategic projects. The paper 
argues that the Australian strategy’s gradual shift from an interventionist to a market-led 
orientation played out in competing representations of failure. Whether particular policies 
were perceived as failures depended not only on their material effects, but also on the ways in 
which failure was defined and on the values underpinning those definitions. As 
representations of failure establish the boundaries between the incremental adaptations that 
stabilise an accumulation strategy and the more radical failures characteristic of crisis, they 
illuminate how processes of discursive selectivity ‘fix’ state projects’ temporal, scalar and 
spatial dimensions. 
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Introduction 
This paper uses the lens of ‘failure’ to understand Australia’s 1983–1996 attempt to shift from 
its long-standing accumulation strategy, known as the Australian Settlement, to a new strategy 
built around the perceived imperative of developing an ‘internationally competitive’ economy. At 
its inception in 1983, Australia’s new strategy sought to address the economy’s structural 
deficiencies by restructuring domestic production, reforming the labour market, reducing trade 
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barriers and championing the creation of a community of Asia-Pacific states. Initially, these 
interventions were coupled with redistributive social policies that intended to preserve 
Australia’s (then) egalitarian social structures and values. For O’Neill and Fagan (2006, p. 206), 
these years of “state engineered market liberalism” constitute “a continuously intense time of 
crises in State role and power, alongside a most dramatic series of experimentations as firms 
and governments sought new, durable, successful forms of economy.”  Yet a stable new 
settlement proved elusive.  Despite numerous policy adjustments, difficulties persisted and the 
1996 federal election brought a socially conservative and economically neo-liberal opposition 
party into power.  
This paper’s empirical content seeks to understand how Australia’s visionary strategy 
was gradually transformed, why years of incremental policy adjustment failed to secure a stable 
new path, and why the eventual outcome was the election of a socially conservative and 
capital-oriented regime. Its account of this history is informed by Jessop’s (1990) state-oriented 
version of regulation theory, a theoretical framework that focuses attention on the state’s 
inherently problematic task of coordinating economy and society. This approach is especially 
useful in analysing national transformations because it considers the state’s role in mediating 
opposing interests and highlights the spatial implications of policy change. From its 
perspective, the Australian Labor government’s reforms in the crucial years 1983–1996 
constitute a state strategy; that is, a coherent “programmed path of actions” that seek to 
implement “an overall vision of a desired state of affairs” (Jessop et al., 1993, p. 240; after 
Jessop, 1990).  The paper’s reconstruction of Australia’s strategic path of actions draws on 
existing political economy accounts (Bell, 1997; Bryan and Rafferty, 1999; Fagan and Webber, 
1994; O’Neill and Fagan, 2006; Webber et al., 1991; Webber, 1998; Webber and Weller, 2001) 
but makes an original contribution by emphasising how politically contested interpretations of 
policy failure shaped the policy trajectory.1 It then uses these insights to contribute to 
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connecting one of regulation theory’s “missing links” – the “transition rules” governing the onset 
of crises in accumulation strategies (Tickell and Peck, 1992, pp. 208–209). Showing how 
representations of failure infuse the political processes through which crises develop, mutate 
and sometimes resolve helps to explain both the resilience of capitalism and its intermittent 
transformations. 
The paper is divided into five sections. The next section locates the notion of failure in 
regulation theories and the literatures of state strategies, policy adjustment and crisis. It 
highlights the politicised nature of the idea of failure and the ways that assessments of failure 
express opposing interests, value frameworks and ideologies. The discussion identifies three 
principal ways in which failures are represented in political discourse—the unifying failures that 
motivate a visionary project, the stabilising failures that reinforce a state strategy and the de-
stabilising failures that lead to crisis. It argues that representations of past failures are 
embedded in political narratives in ways that lend coherence to visionary projects, justify their 
selective policy strategies and contribute to their discursive re-imagining of nations and national 
interests. The third section examines how representations of failure were invoked in Australia’s 
strategic transformation. It shows that although representations of failure sometimes advanced 
the state’s strategic projects and sometimes undermined them, they consistently worked to 
support political projects. Drawing on this example, Section Four then discusses how a state’s 
capacity to manage perceptions of failure plays a pivotal role in the evolution of state strategic 
projects (Jessop, 2001), the spatial selectivity of state actions (Jones, 1997), and the rescaling 
of state spaces (Brenner, 2004). The conclusions reflect further on the role of failure in political 
transformations. 
Strategic Policy Failures 
In Jessop’s (1990, p. 6) version of regulation theory, the activities of states are guided by 
accumulation strategies that combine “an economic growth model, with its preconditions” and 
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“a strategy for its realisation.” A successful accumulation strategy integrates the interests of 
business and social groups under the leadership of one dominant (hegemonic) coalition and 
through it secures a set of economic and social conditions conducive to capital accumulation.2 
The state is understood as a social relation produced by (the class relations among) its 
constituents. Jessop’s approach emphasises the discursive processes through which actors 
construct perceptions of their common interests and focuses attention on the social 
organisation of institutions, social forms, political processes and cultural norms that secure the 
stability of the capitalist accumulation process. For Jessop (1990), a state’s capacity to secure 
a stable accumulation system at a particular place and time—that is, its capacity to establish a 
viable ‘socio-temporal fix’—depends on its strategic capacity, defined as its capacity to realise 
an overall vision, and its strategic selectivity, or the differential privileging of some institutions, 
policies, actions and actors over others.3  Jones (1997) highlights the inherent spatial selectivity 
of these processes. 
Regulation theory views capitalist regimes as inherently unstable. States’ strategies 
are challenged continually by the contradictory nature of capitalist social relations as well as by 
a range of place- and time-specific contingencies. The selection of state strategies is therefore 
bedevilled by uncertainty. Because the viability of alternative policy options can never be 
known in advance, in practice policy trajectories are revealed incrementally. Experimental, trial-
and-error processes enable an overall strategy to evolve iteratively and recursively toward a 
workable balance among its various aspects; that is, toward a state of ‘structured coherence’ 
(Jessop, 2001; after Harvey, 1985, p. 140). If the tensions that inevitably arise from a strategy’s 
internal contradictions cannot be resolved, crisis ensues. Although the notion of crisis can be 
interpreted in numerous ways (O’Connor, 1988), this paper follows Hay’s (1999, p. 317) 
definition in which crises are politically-mediated moments of decisive intervention that alter a 
state’s policy trajectory. Crisis ruptures the dominant political coalition, challenges its vision and 
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refutes its strategy.  Crisis leads to the establishment of a new coalition armed with policies 
capable of restoring accumulation. This process generates regulation theory’s characteristic 
periodisations of history into successive spatio-temporal fixes such as the hypothesised 
transitions from Fordism to post-Fordism or Keynesianism to neo-liberalism.  
The problem with regulation theory’s account of crisis is that it does not explain, 
beyond the generality of capitalism’s inherent contradictions, when and how ‘fixes’ de-stabilise 
or why some contradictions can be accommodated within a strategy whilst others fuel crises. 
As Painter and Goodwin (1995, p. 340) comment: “A crude account of one stable and enduring 
mode [of regulation] quickly breaking down and then equally quickly being replaced by a 
markedly different but equally stable new arrangement is clearly unsatisfactory and historically 
inaccurate.” Regulation theory has not specified when, why or how a stable spatio-temporal fix 
slips toward irretrievable crisis, nor has it adequately theorised the role of human agency in 
shaping this destabilisation (Jenson, 1990; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Painter and 
Goodwin, 1995; Tickell and Peck, 1992). This omission is important because without an 
adequate understanding of this process, regulation theory’s periodisations of history collapse 
into continuous crisis (Amin and Robins, 1990) or continuous adaptation (Kerr, 2002). If the 
idea of successive spatio-temporal fixes is to be retained, the conditions of stability and crisis 
must be specified. 
Understanding the mechanisms that produce crises requires understanding how state 
strategies play out in political practice. Numerous studies have shown that the timing and 
determinants of political crises hinge on the complex relationship between concrete material 
conditions, interests and ideas (see O’Connor, 1988). Whilst material conditions are central 
underlying factors (Webber, 1991; see also Dunford, 1990), they do not explain the 
serendipitous timing of actual crises in some cases or the notable absence of crisis, despite 
adverse economic conditions, in others. The role of ideas, representations and discourses in 
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determining the timing, mechanisms and nature of crises has therefore attracted considerable 
scholarly interest (for example, Blyth, 1997; Jenson, 1990; Hay, 1996; 1999). This literature 
recognises that a state’s capacity to implement its strategy is inextricably bound up with its 
capacity to maintain simultaneously a coherent vision of the future and a plausible explanation 
of the past. This task relies on the mobilisation of complex systems of representation and their 
amalgamation in persuasive narratives that underpin public support for a leadership, secure the 
legitimacy of its strategy and justify its policy interventions.   
In Hay’s (1999) view, crises are constructed, by political actors, in alternative narratives 
that reassess past policy experiments. Although multiple meta-narrations could potentially 
explain past events, the context and its history will tend to selectively favour some meta-
narratives over others. This indeterminacy means that narratives are discursively selective 
(Hay, 1999, p. 324). Complex political processes determine which stories dominate. In Hay’s 
view, the political success of a meta-narrative depends less on the objective accuracy of its 
assessment of material conditions than on its ability to fashion a convincing story that draws in 
and flexibly narrates multiple symptoms. In his analysis, this process involves branding some 
past policy experiments as failures.  
Crises ensue only when political actors opposed to the dominant regime successfully 
reconstruct past events in a way that combines multiple small policy failures into an 
overarching meta-narrative of systemic failure (Hall, 1980, p. 174 cited in Hay, 1999, pp. 332–
5). Because this is no easy task, a system’s contradictions may persist over time as 
‘catastrophic equilibria’ (Hay, 1996) or resolve inadvertently at ‘tipping points’ in an incremental 
policy reform process (see also Block, 1981).  Blyth (2002) shows that crises tend to occur at 
times of intensified uncertainty, when policy ‘anomalies’ cannot be explained within extant 
frameworks or resolved by an existing repertoire of policy instruments (see also Hall, 1993). At 
these times, contestation over opposing representations of past policy experiments intensifies 
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as political actors struggle to provide convincing explanations of, and effective remedies to, 
policy dilemmas. Blyth (2002, pp. 33–34) activates the notion of failure by viewing it as a tool in 
political struggle that mediates the tension between “ideas held by agents” and their 
“structurally derived interests.” These accounts show that the notion of crisis is both entwined 
with and complicated by politicised representations of failure.  
The notion of failure is unavoidably political.  Ideas of failure express the multiple 
interpretations and assessments that can be made of the same material circumstances and 
events. Interpretations reflect actors’ spatio-temporal positions: the histories and contingencies 
through which they comprehend events, the temporal horizons over which they elect to assess 
them and their relative positions in networks of power. Assessments of whether or not an 
event, policy or strategy is a failure give specific expression to opposing interests, value 
frameworks and ideologies. Different value frameworks generate different assessment criteria. 
Hood (1991) argues that assessments of actual events incorporate complex combinations of 
three foundational understandings of failure: economic failure (waste or inefficiency), moral 
failure (unethical conduct) and risk-based failure (instability or breakdown).  
Representations of failure can have a destabilising, stabilising or unifying role in 
political processes and state strategies. First, in regulation theories, failure is a synonym for 
contradiction, and as such is inherently destabilising (Hay, 1996; see also Jessop, 1998). In 
this guise, crises arise when the numerous ‘conjunctural’ failures of specific strategic policy 
experiments accumulate and condense into structural crises that mark the generalised failure 
of a strategy to resolve its presenting contradictions. By this view, although pragmatic policy 
adjustments may resolve a state strategy’s short-term problems, they are likely to compromise 
its motivating aims and threaten its political legitimacy in the longer term. Incremental policy 
changes may defer or resolve presenting tensions for a time, but crises will surely develop. In 
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the light of this tendency, Malpas and Wickham (1995) conclude that visionary state projects 
are inherently prone to failure.   
Second, and alternatively, failures can be depicted as having a stabilising influence on 
state strategies. In evolutionary accounts of policy making, policy development is viewed as a 
process of trial and error learning in which small policy failures are the catalysts that enable 
political, economic and social systems to evolve together toward ‘structured coherence.’ From 
this perspective, adaptive responses to failure enable states to ‘muddle through’ successive 
policy experiments and to avert crises (Lindblom, 1959, see also Kerr, 2002). Here the policy 
trajectory is conditioned by past policy decisions and the path-dependent webs of 
understanding they generate, rather than being motivated by visionary aims (Heclo 1974, p. 
303). From this perspective, internal adjustment processes are guided by expert opinion and 
are expected to avert crises. Actual crises are therefore explained as the outcome of some 
external shock or change. 4   
Third, failures can be viewed as unifying political projects, especially visionary national 
projects.  In this respect, Ochoa (2003) argues that visionary projects are constructed around 
national socio-cultural values. These values are forged in and defined by exceptional events 
that survive in the collective consciousness as failures that cannot be reconciled with national 
aspirations.  Dunkirk, Gallipoli and Pearl Harbour are examples of this unifying form of failure. 
In Ochoa’s view, the meta-narratives created to support visionary state projects necessarily 
incorporate and gain legitimacy from their selective representations of these defining moments. 
The complex sets of values (for example, self-reliance, democracy and honour) that are 
incorporated implicitly in these identifications constitute the common criteria by which 
contemporary events are assessed politically. For Ochoa, system-wide failures of visionary 
state projects occur at a point of recognition—a specific conjuncture, in his terms, a liminal 
moment—when contemporary events can no longer be reconciled with or contained by a 
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dominant version of the national vision and its story of national identity. At this point of 
disjuncture, multiple small failures of adaptation become publicly recognised as indicative of 
more generalised failure. This temporal positioning of the onset of crisis links it not only to the 
shallow failures of policy experiments conducted in the recent past, but also to the deeper 
failures that infuse national narratives. For Ochoa (2003; see also Debray 1973, p. 153), these 
moments of failure are liberating moments of political possibility that enable a new coalition to 
unify around a revised discursive construction of past events, future ambitions and national 
identity. From Ochoa’s perspective, then, the narratives and meta-narratives of failure that 
frame visionary projects do not only weave stories about presenting social, economic and 
cultural contradictions, they at the same time embed those stories in the emotional appeals of a 
complementary interpretation of national history and national aspirations. Narratives about 
contemporary political failures are therefore intertwined with narratives that define the nation 
and the national scale (and, as a consequence, favour some strategies and spaces over 
others).  
It follows that contradictions generate crises when they are accompanied by changes 
in the way that policy failures are perceived and by related political processes that detach a 
regime’s vision from its discursive embeddedness in the ‘national’ project. Whether the 
tensions and contradictions inherent to capitalism produce crises then depends on a politics of 
representation of failure that is deeply structured by identifications with place and territory. The 
next section shows how representations of failure conditioned the strategic and spatial 
selectivities of Australia’s 1983–96 transformation and how definitions of failure were used to 
unify, stabilise or destabilise the state’s strategy.  
Australia’s Strategic Repositioning 
Australia’s vision of itself as a competitive economy in an Asia-Pacific region exemplifies the 
ways in which representations of failure both secure the stability of a dominant regime and 
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mark its demise. This section’s account of Australia’s state strategy is organised into four parts, 
each focusing on a different aspect of failure. The first describes how a shared view of failure 
unified a coalition of interests in support of the ‘international competitiveness’ strategy. The 
second shows how representations of failure facilitated policy adjustment and stabilised the 
new strategy. It also demonstrates that these gradual adjustments transformed the strategy’s 
vision, reworked its priorities and reconfigured the composition of its leadership coalition. The 
third section examines the failure of Australia’s strategy of regional engagement. The fourth 
section describes how an opposition group armed with an alternative version of the national 
vision induced crisis by highlighting the national strategy’s regional and international failures.   
Unifying Failure and the Vision of International Competitiveness 
By the early 1980s, there was general consensus among Australia’s policy elite that the 
‘Australian Settlement’—a class compromise based on the three pillars of white migration, 
trade protection and centralised wage determination—had failed to prepare the Australian 
economy for the changes that were expected to accompany globalisation (Australia, 1979). The 
material basis of this consensus was Australia’s declining terms of trade. The trade index, 
which measures exports relative to imports, had fallen from 240 in 1951 to 100 in 1985 
(Ravenhill, 1994, p. 76). The Settlement’s Keynesian policy settings had not been able to 
control the domestic economy’s struggle with the twin problems of inflation and unemployment. 
The repeated failure of Keynesian policy solutions had discredited the Keynesian approach. 
Although these tensions had been mounting since the late 1960s, this account begins in 1983, 
when the election of a reformist Labor government began the implementation of a visionary 
state strategy that aimed to transform Australia and create an ‘internationally competitive’ 
economy.  
The new regime, led by a former trade union leader, R.J. Hawke, used the failure of 
Keynesian policies to unify an unlikely coalition of political forces under the ‘international 
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competitiveness’ vision. The first of its three main constituencies was the export sector, which 
supported the rapid internationalisation of the economy with a view to restoring the profitability 
of primary export industries (agriculture and mining). Second were the domestic manufacturing 
and business sectors, which supported reforms that would integrate Australian businesses into 
the production structures of a globalising economy. Third was the union movement, led by the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), which supported reform within the corporatist 
frameworks of Scandinavian social democracy (Webber, 1998). A quasi-corporatist decision-
making framework reconciled these disparate interests and provided the capacity for the state 
to embark on a radical reform strategy.  
 The vision’s implementation first targeted finance markets, product markets and labour 
markets. In December 1983 the new government floated the Australian dollar and relaxed 
associated financial controls to expose the economy to international market forces. Next, in the 
labour market, it negotiated a series of wages and incomes ‘Accords’ in which real wage 
reductions would be offset by expanded health, education and social services. In production 
sectors, industry policies encouraged technological modernisation, productivity gains and 
product quality improvement. Rationalisations in trade-vulnerable sectors aimed to improve the 
economy’s overall efficiency by freeing capital for more productive uses (Fagan and Webber, 
1994). The tariffs and quotas that had previously protected Australian firms from import 
competition were then gradually removed.  
Stabilising Failure and Incremental Policy Adjustment 
The strategy quickly began to unravel. The entry of foreign banks and the removal of limits on 
offshore borrowing produced a frenzy of geared investments and fuelled asset inflation. Instead 
of settling at a market level, where the exchange rate would optimally regulate import and 
export prices, the Australian dollar became a speculative currency. Fluctuations in its value 
increased business risks and undermined the economy’s stability. The flood of money from 
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offshore resulted in iconic but undervalued Australian firms being liquidated by asset-stripping 
raiders (Sykes, 1996). As Australia’s international position deteriorated, the ‘balance of 
payments crisis’ came to dominate the policy debate (Bell, 1997). 
The struggle to identify the best path forward threw up a range of interpretations of the 
situation and its failures. The export sector saw the problem as access to global markets. It 
advocated action at the supranational scale to promote free trade. It opposed interventionist 
domestic industry policies, arguing that the state could not effectively ‘pick winners’ and that the 
market should be allowed to find (Pareto equilibrium) solutions. Within the business sector, lack 
of progress was attributed to microeconomic over-regulation and the slow rate of labour market 
reform. Business supported neo-Schumpeterian interventions to promote innovation and create 
advanced technology industries. The ACTU’s understanding focused on Australia’s chronic 
lack of investment funds. It advocated policies to attract capital and redirect it toward productive 
uses (ACTU and TDC, 1987).5  
These competing explanations of policy failure reflected and highlighted the opposing 
value frameworks and economic paradigms that co-existed within the state coalition (contrast 
AMC, 1986; IAC, 1987 and BCA, 1991). However, the protagonists did not question the 
fundamental tenets of the international competitiveness vision, although each maintained a 
different understanding of it. They shared a focus on efficiency-related values, albeit in different 
combinations with social considerations, and all accorded spatial priority to the national scale. 
At this stage, the strategy’s many difficulties were successfully represented as adaptive 
failures: the teething problems associated with the transition from the Australian Settlement to 
the new ‘internationally competitive’ regime. Nonetheless, the incommensurability of opposing 
positions made it impossible to reach a negotiated compromise. The political stalemate 
encouraged the government to rely increasingly on the policy recommendations generated by 
general computable equilibrium (GCE) econometric modelling of the national economy. 
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Modelling rendered the complex and uncertain policy environment intelligible and enabled 
contested political processes to be represented as a rational, orderly and effortless transition 
between old and new regimes.6  
As debates over the strategy’s direction continued, the ACTU became marginalised as 
the media increasingly depicted it as impeding rather than facilitating labour market reform.7 In 
Jenson’s (1990) terms, the ACTU’s policy solutions were falling outside the parameters of the 
increasingly dominant neo-classical paradigm. Hampson and Morgan (1999, p. 771) locate the 
ACTU’s exclusion from the strategic debate (and therefore from the hegemonic coalition that 
was the national state) to a shift in the media’s use of language from 1986, when it began using 
the words ‘industry policy’ to describe labour market reform but not investment policy. Thus, the 
process of identifying policy solutions to presenting failures involved power struggles that 
culminated in deeper realignments of power geometries within the coalition of interests that 
comprised the state (see Massey, 1993). This narrowed the effective arena of political 
contestation, altered the policy trajectory and changed the character of future policy debates. 
In this uncertain context, the state’s capacity to make policy changes hinged 
increasingly on the persuasive rhetoric of the Treasurer, Paul Keating. His oratory created a 
crusading sense of purpose and set the policy agenda. Keating was a conscious political 
performer (Gordon 1993, p. 1). He frequently invoked momentous occasions in national history, 
such as Australia’s World War I defeat at Gallipoli, to justify his vision and bind it to a reshaped 
national identity. He was deliberate in his use of language, which he saw as the principal tool of 
his political craft (Gordon 1993, p. 45).  
In May 1986, Keating issued his famous warning that without a sharp adjustment, 
Australia was in danger of becoming a ‘banana republic’. The media’s dogged focus on this 
representation turned what might otherwise have been a throw-away line into a warning that 
the internationally competitive vision was faltering (Hampson and Morgan, 1999; Kelly, 1992). 
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This event acts as a switching point, a moment of public recognition of policy failure that 
precipitated a major realignment of the state’s strategy. The fear that Australia would descend 
to ‘banana republic’ status externalised the blame for Australia’s policy failures to global market 
forces and depicted further reform as a national challenge. This moment was deployed to 
justify new policy settings—higher interest rates, restrained government expenditures and 
accelerated labour market reforms (Button, 1988)—that would inevitably produce hardships for 
ordinary wage-earners (Bell, 1997). Although they were represented as tackling the externally-
induced balance of payments crisis, Bell (2004) argues that the new policy settings were in fact 
targeting the internal threat of inflation.  
As it transpired, these policy adjustments exacerbated the deepening financial crisis. 
The cash interest rate had reached 18% by 1989, crippling businesses and households. In a 
context devoid of guiding precedents, the government resolved that gradually easing interest 
rates would restabilise the economy. However, instead of the expected ‘soft landing,’ the 
approach produced a bust (Bell, 2004, p. 59). Australia’s policy-induced recession lasted from 
September 1989 until December 1992 (Boehm and Liew, 1994). It generated numerous firm 
failures and massive job losses. Deteriorating material conditions might have been expected to 
plunge the government’s strategy into crisis. However, in another rhetorical flourish, Treasurer 
Keating reaffirmed the government’s resolve and restabilised the strategy by announcing, in 
November 1990, that this was “the recession Australia had to have” (see Kelly, 1992). Here 
Keating represented policy failure as a necessary stage in the transition to an internationally 
competitive economy. The recession has continued to be represented as having corrected the 
policy mistakes of the late 1980s by bringing down interest rates and “killing off’’ both inflation 
and inflationary expectations (McFarlane, 2006, p. 3). Public acceptance of the necessity of 
recession enabled the further marketisation of the economy. In the March 1991 Economic 
Statement (Button, 1991) the government unilaterally liberalised Australia’s trade barriers, well 
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in advance of World Trade Organisation (WTO) targets, and accelerated domestic industry 
reforms without first consulting the manufacturing sector (Hershan, 1996).  
In retrospect, these changes mark the point at which the government finally rejected 
interventionist industry policies and embraced the comparative advantage-based approach that 
was favoured by trade-oriented sectors. Of the three original constituencies of the state 
coalition, only the export sector and its supporters in the globalised financial services sector 
remained influential. Consolidating this reorientation, Treasurer Keating became Prime Minister 
in December 1991. This shift in power relations also marked the point at which political 
networks based in Australia’s southern manufacturing centre, Melbourne, were replaced by 
political networks grounded in New South Wales and the emerging global city of Sydney. This 
both reflected and reinforced Sydney’s increasing economic dominance in the internationalising 
economy (see O’Neill and McGuirk, 2005).  
Keating’s 1992 One Nation reform package introduced a range of measures to 
stimulate the economy out of recession, mitigate economic hardships among low income 
households, stimulate disadvantaged regions, and further encourage surviving manufacturing 
firms to internationalise their operations (Keating, 1992). Although these measures helped the 
Keating government to win the 1993 general election, they also brought a new set of failures 
into focus. Australia’s international competitiveness relied on export market development but 
market access was stalled by other countries’ trade barriers. It became clear that policy would 
have to shift again, to intervene strategically beyond the boundaries of the state’s territorial 
jurisdiction (Keating, 2000). 
Failure and Australia’s Regional Engagement 
Representations of territory and scale are routinely harnessed to support states’ geopolitical 
strategies (Ó’Thuathail, 2002). Australia’s internationalisation strategy re-imagined Australia’s 
 16  
geographical location by representing Australia as part of an Asia-Pacific region. This spatial 
strategy altered both the dimensions and horizons of national action by creating an Asia-Pacific 
socio-spatial scale through which Australia could pursue its interests. 
Australia’s regional reorientation relied on comparative advantage trade theory’s 
expectation that Australia could not compete internationally in labour intensive industries but 
that its raw materials could fuel the world’s manufacturing boom (Garnaut, 1989). Strategic and 
security concerns were also important. Policymakers feared that if post-Cold War geopolitical 
re-alignments created a triadic structure of trade blocs led by the United States, Japan and 
Germany, Australia would become excluded from global commerce. In addition, Australia’s 
growing markets in Asia were potentially threatened by shifts in the United States’ trade 
policies (Ravenhill, 2001). As the same time, the United States’ diminishing military role in the 
Pacific raised security concerns (Dibb, 1986).   
A policy focus on the undifferentiated commodities in which Australia enjoyed a 
‘natural’ comparative advantage logically favoured the establishment of open markets in a rule-
based global trading system. But as a small nation in a peripheral location, Australia had limited 
capacity to influence international relations. It seemed, therefore, that the only feasible means 
by which Australia could pursue its interests abroad was through cooperation with other 
nations. Here the strategy followed the precedent of the ‘Cairns Group of Fair Trading Nations,’ 
an Australia-led group of agricultural exporting nations that had successfully influenced GATT 
negotiations in the 1980s (Higgott and Cooper, 1990).  
Accordingly, Australia’s repositioning materialised in the creation of an imagined region 
called the Asia-Pacific. From the start, however, this construct was uncomfortably ambiguous. 
Its territorial dimensions did not represent a culturally or politically defined Asia or a coherent 
group of Pacific Rim nations (Dirlik, 1998) and critics saw it as a means to avoid the difficult 
social and cultural implications of genuine Asian engagement (Fitzgerald, 1997). Nonetheless, 
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the Asia-Pacific idea was institutionalised in 1989, after intense diplomacy by Australia and 
Japan, in the form of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Its founding 
members included Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, the Republic of the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei.8 Consistent 
with its multilateral priorities, Australia had initially envisaged APEC as the precursor to “a more 
formal intergovernmental vehicle” with regulatory power over trade and industry (Hawke, 1989 
in Cooper et al., 1993, p. 92). It would become a new scale of government—a Pacific 
equivalent to the European Union—able to regulate property rights and set labour market 
conditions. In Australia’s vision, APEC would establish a new tier in a hierarchically nested 
framework, positioned ‘above’ the national and intermediate regional scales (such as ASEAN, 
EAEC, AFTA and NAFTA) and ‘below’ the global scale of the WTO.9 If member states could 
then be convinced to agree to trade rules based on the non-discriminatory notion of ‘open 
regionalism,’ APEC would function as a catalyst to global trade liberalisation (see Bergsten, 
1997). In other words, Australia saw APEC as a strategic institution and as a vehicle for 
securing access to export markets.  
However, although APEC’s initial 1994 (Bogor) and 1995 (Osaka) meetings made in-
principle commitments to free trade, member states shied away from binding trade agreements 
that might involve relinquishing their national sovereignty (Kahler, 2000). At the 1996 (Manila) 
summit, leaders’ failure to produce promised ‘Individual Action Plans’ stalled progress. By the 
1997 meeting in Vancouver, held after the onset of the Asian economic crisis, APEC had split 
along an east to west axis (Higgott, 1999). By 2000, APEC’s trade liberalisation and region-
building visions had collapsed (Ravenhill, 2001). 
Clearly, APEC failed to develop in the way Australia had intended. First, it was never 
likely that the various groupings of APEC member states would agree to subordinate their 
interests to APEC or support the contentious concept of ‘open regionalism’ (Ostry, 1998).10 
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Second, APEC was compromised by competing organisational logics. Its representation as a 
space of political cooperation between states contradicted its role in creating a seamless 
regional space of capitalist competition (Ravenhill, 1995). Third, APEC was divided by 
competing interests that overshadowed Australia’s objectives. It simultaneously provided a 
means by which ASEAN states could assert their interests relative to Japan and the United 
States (Maull, 2002), a means by which Japan could consolidate its investments and 
production networks in Asia and a means by which the United States could stem Japanese 
economic expansion (Cooper et al., 1993). Although this multiplicity was partly accommodated 
by the development of a scalar division of labour within APEC, the resulting organisational 
complexity created an unstable institutional space crosscut by ‘horizontal’ struggles among 
states, ‘vertical’ inter-scalar struggles among competing international groupings and persistent 
differences between ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ interests (see Rüland, 2002).11 
Although Australia’s narrative of Asian engagement positioned APEC in a story of 
progress toward open trade and regional cooperation (Keating, 2000), Australia’s region-
building strategy encountered repeated rebuttals. These included ASEAN states’ 1991 rejection 
of the idea that APEC would develop into a form of government, Australia’s failed attempts to 
contain APEC territorially, and Australia’s exclusion from an important Asia–Europe trade 
meeting in 1996 (Fitzgerald, 1997). These international policy failures reflected irresolvable 
differences in interests, values and priorities – differences that could never be resolved by 
incremental policy adjustment.  
Australia’s engagement with the Asia-Pacific region declined in 1996 with the defeat of 
the Keating government and the onset of the Asian financial crisis.12 However, the pursuit of 
regional engagement had produced material changes in international relations and trade 
patterns. It had altered power relationships among constituencies within Australia, among 
states to Australia’s north and among states and firms in the region. But Australia’s 
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internationalisation objectives were at odds with the realities of its uncertain position in the 
Asia-Pacific division of labour (Higgott, 1987). Despite its self-referential objectives and its 
representation of itself as a state of the Asia-Pacific, Australia had little influence over the 
states to its north and was not able to transcend their historically inscribed perceptions of 
Australia’s isolationism, its long-standing association with (Commonwealth) colonialism or its 
contemporary association with the United States.  
Failure, Vision and National Identity 
Australia’s internationalisation strategy was ultimately defeated by a crisis of legitimacy in the 
domestic polity. Before the 1996 election, an ultra-conservative political party emerged to give 
a stridently xenophobic voice to the dissatisfactions brewing in the rural and working class 
regions that had borne the costs of Australia’s domestic reform process. In addition to 
appropriating the name of the Keating government’s 1992 reform package, One Nation, the 
new organisation challenged Keating’s inclusive rhetoric and directly targeted his Asian 
engagement narrative. One Nation’s opposition brought to the surface the many contradictions 
within the international competitiveness strategy. In particular, it highlighted the uneven 
regional consequences of the reform process and the apparent disappearance of the 1983 
vision’s motivating ‘national’ values of equity and fairness. One Nation forced Australians to 
recognise that the vision had changed in meaning and content as it had evolved, and that the 
market-led policies being enacted in the name of international competitiveness no longer 
resembled the policies they had supported at the strategy’s inception. Reform had not delivered 
jobs or prosperity to regional Australia, and the nationally-oriented political agenda seemed not 
to recognise the growing distributional inequities it had produced (see O’Neill, 1996).  
 One Nation effectively disempowered Paul Keating’s forward-looking narrative of 
Australia and of its place in the world by making his representations of the national interest 
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appear contrived. One Nation’s supporters positioned themselves as the ‘real’ Australians by 
invoking the values of egalitarian mateship—values that are grounded in the Gallipoli 
experience and the rigours of outback life—that had been suppressed by Keating’s 
cosmopolitan and multicultural revision of Australian identity. Importantly, One Nation was a 
grassroots movement. Its leadership had emerged from outside the national policy elite’s 
networks of power. The government’s inability to silence One Nation’s racist commentary—or 
to influence the negative media coverage of it in Asia and the United States—undermined its 
internal authority and Australia’s international position (Dieter, 2002). Although One Nation did 
not attract widespread political support within Australia, it did succeed in breaking the spell that 
had been cast by Paul Keating’s rhetoric. Thereafter, the numerous small failures that had 
gradually transformed the policy direction were recast as evidence of systemic failure.  
The 1996 election of a neo-conservative Liberal government affirmed this perceptual 
shift. The new state coalition did not include One Nation but did incorporate key elements of its 
platform. The incoming Liberal government intensified market-based reforms, accelerated 
attacks on organised labour and introduced harsh measures to reduce welfare dependency. 
These reforms consolidated rather than redirected the Keating government’s already market-
oriented economic policy framework. The new administration responded to One Nation’s 
challenge by realigning social policies to restore a sense of stability and celebrate social 
obligation, family values, naturalised social hierarchies and authoritarian government.13 These 
measures deliberately slowed of the rate of social change and turned the national vision to 
traditional conservative values. They neutralised the disaffection in regional areas, but at the 
same time imposed limits on the new government’s capacity to reform the welfare and health 
sectors. The vision of international competitiveness disappeared from the policy discourse and 
the notion of Asian engagement was replaced by a more pragmatic bilateral approach to 
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foreign policy that focused on China, which by 1996 was emerging as the primary market for 
Australia’s exports (Ravenhill, 2003).  
Despite almost 25 years of reform, the problems that prompted the 1983 change in 
Australia’s regulatory approach have not been resolved. Australia's share of world exports 
continues to fall (Kunkel, 2002). Aggregate GDP growth is high by world standards, but the 
economy relies on volatile and finite mineral exports. Declining exports of elaborately 
transformed manufactures demonstrate that Australian firms are not integrating successfully 
into networks of global production.14 Moreover, trade policy reforms have inadvertently 
damaged sectors in which Australia should, in theory, have had a comparative advantage 
(Fagan, 1997). What the reforms have achieved is the internationalisation of capital and the 
concentration of finance capital and associated services in the ‘global’ city of Sydney. By 2006, 
$4.25 in every $100.00 earned in Australia (4.25% of GDP) was transferred to foreign investors 
(Colebatch, 2006).  
Strategy, Failure and New State Spaces 
Initially, the failures of the Australian Settlement had unified political support for a new state 
strategy, a new interpretation of Australia’s history and a new internationally competitive future. 
This enabled the Australian government to act as the instrument of the national will and to 
represent itself both domestically and internationally as a coherent, monolithic actor working in 
the national interest. The visionary strategy succeeded in advancing nation-building objectives 
and in creating a representation not just of Australia’s interests, but of ‘Australia’ as a collective 
identity.  As a result, Australia’s gradual shift toward neo-liberal policies in the years 1983–1996 
strengthened rather than ‘hollowed-out’ the nation-state.  
For a time, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments were able to represent the 
strategy’s implementation failures as faltering steps toward the establishment of a structurally 
coherent new regulatory regime. The representation of Australia as being in transition from the 
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old and unsustainable Settlement to a sustainable and internationally competitive new reality 
softened public resistance to policy reforms. But despite numerous incremental changes, the 
strategy failed to stabilise into a durable new ‘spatio-temporal fix’. Rather, political struggles 
within the dominant coalition narrowed the state’s networks of power and progressively 
transformed both the vision and the values it represented.  The market-oriented realignment of 
the strategy after 1991 averted a system-wide crisis but threatened the strategy’s longer term 
viability. Although the shift to regional engagement diverted attention from intensifying domestic 
problems and temporarily stretched the state’s influence beyond its own borders, the attempt to 
create a ‘new state space’ in Asia ultimately failed, as did the campaign for global trade 
liberalisation. The strategy’s emphasis on national export performance in a nationally-focused, 
comparative advantage framework hardened territorial boundaries. 
The political repercussions of these failures materialised at the sub-national scale as 
political support for One Nation flourished in agricultural exporting regions. In contrast to the 
Australian Settlement, which had used taxation, wage and industry policy to distribute the 
nation’s wealth among Australia’s constituent regional States, the international competitiveness 
strategy did not incorporate an effective re-distribution mechanism. Its inherent spatial 
selectivities marginalised trade-exposed regions and privileged Australia’s most internationally 
connected places, especially the urban centre of Sydney (O’Neill, 1996; O’Neill and McGuirk, 
2005). These uneven regional outcomes were a key pillar of One Nation’s political appeal. 
This key period in Australia’s history demonstrates how representations of failure 
underpin the durability of state accumulation strategies. First, it shows that policy development 
trajectories do not simply evolve in a process of ‘policy learning’ within a state administration 
(Hall, 1993; Heclo, 1974), but that trajectories are shaped by struggles among competing 
representations of a vision and played out in debates over how emerging policy failures should 
be understood and addressed. Emotive representations of failure that stir nationalist 
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sentiments, as exemplified in this case by the ‘banana republic’ and the ‘recession Australia 
had to have’ themes, play a crucial role in establishing the policy direction and in generating 
political support for additional reform. Second, the account highlights the inextricable link 
between shifts in strategy and shifts in power relations within a ruling coalition. As the 
Australian strategy evolved, political struggles over policy selection gradually reconfigured its 
political coalitions.  The ACTU and manufacturing industry interests were progressively 
excluded from policy-making networks. As this process narrowed the range of ideas that were 
recognised as viable solutions to policy dilemmas, it narrowed the range of policy options 
available to the state; that is, its ‘policy repertoire’ (Jessop, 2003). This in turn compromised the 
state’s capacity to anticipate or address the dissatisfactions that found a voice in One Nation. 
Third, the account has demonstrated that interactions among scales shape the transformation 
of strategies. As the government concentrated on ‘internationalising’ the national scale through 
international engagement, One Nation’s vision developed in regional Australia and invoked a 
pioneering, rural imaginary of nationhood. The idea of nation was being reconfigured through 
relations among scales. Fourth, the account shows how representations of failure mediate 
transitions between strategies and govern the onset of crisis. Despite its numerous failings, the 
international competitiveness strategy was not challenged until, in 1996, One Nation was able 
to combine its multiple failures into a narrative of systemic failure. One Nation highlighted the 
disparity between the vision’s aims and the material realities of its impact on households and 
communities, the gap between its original balance of economic and social justice values and 
the efficiency-dominated value framework of its later mutated form, the flawed logics of its 
regional engagement ambitions, and its failure to maintain engagement with regional 
Australia’s understanding of the nation and of national aspirations. The first three of these 
failings highlight the strategy’s inability to find a workable balance between economic and 
social regulation. They could have been addressed by further policy adjustment. It was the 
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failure to maintain a coherent narrative of national unity that enabled One Nation to challenge 
the strategy’s overall credibility. This was the crucial element governing the timing of the 
strategy’s political defeat. By shifting the way the international competitiveness strategy 
articulated with the idea of nation, One Nation effectively altered the criteria by which the 
strategy’s failures were judged.  
Conclusion 
This paper has focused on how contested representations of failure shape the evolution and 
eventual disintegration of state strategies. It has considered three constructions of failure: 
‘unifying’ representations that enable visionary state projects to develop; ‘stabilising’ 
representations that reinforce a state’s capacity to govern; and ‘destabilising’ representations 
that challenge a dominant coalition’s long-term vision. The political deployment of notions of 
failure helps to explain the processes that stabilise a state strategy or propel it toward crisis. 
Stable regimes have the capacity to depict small policy failures as routine, and to use them to 
justify policy realignments. This depoliticises policy failure and makes it possible to represent 
policy reforms as uncontroversial adjustments to changing circumstances. But the process of 
incremental change will destabilise a strategy if the policy trajectory diverges from its motivating 
vision and if its accompanying systems of representation fail to link day-to-day policymaking 
with visionary objectives and national aspirations.  
The ‘structured coherence’ characteristic of a stable state strategy therefore requires 
more than a set of complementary policies and institutions that facilitate economic and social 
reproduction – it also requires that policies are integrated in a narrative that unites a political 
community. Opposing groups that find a means to link their proposals to a coherent alternative 
version of the national story have the capacity to represent small failures as evidence of 
system-wide failure. By the same token, visionary state projects are thrown into crisis when a 
dominant coalition loses the capacity to incorporate its failures into an evolving story of national 
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development and national identity. Linking sequences of policy adaptation to their deeper 
associations with national aspirations explains the timing of the onset of crises in accumulation 
strategies and addresses one of regulation theory’s enduring ‘missing links’ by providing a 
systematic account of the mechanisms governing the transition from one regime of 
accumulation to another. 
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Endnotes
                                                     
1 The possibility that other, equally plausible versions of this history could be constructed is 
acknowledged (see Cameron and Palan, 2004; Graham, 1992). 
2 Space considerations prevent a full account of regulation theory. See Aglietta (1979) and summaries 
by Jessop (1990) and Dunford (1990).  
3 Jessop (2002:5) defines a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ as an “ensemble of socially embedded, socially 
regularised and strategically selective institutions, organisations, social forces and actions organised 
around … the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation.” 
4 In Hall’s (1993, p. 280) ‘policy learning’ approach multiple incremental changes culminate in the 
‘paradigmatic’ changes indicative of crisis (see also Etzioni, 1967).  
5 Bryan (1995) argues that these options were based on flawed understandings of the implications of 
capital mobility. 
6 Because these models operationalise neo-classical expectations, they support neo-classical policy 
recommendations. Their aspatial and atemporal assumptions combine with their ‘closed’ nature to 
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preclude assessment of the Australian economy’s changing global position, the uneven sub-national 
effects of policy change or the dynamic nature of change processes (Toohey, 1994). 
7 Moreover, the labour movement was fracturing internally as wage restraint and industry restructuring 
altered union power structures. Inflation had undermined political coalitions built on the simple premise 
that increasing workers’ wages would make them better off (Bell, 1997). 
8 China, Taipei and Hong Kong joined in 1991, Mexico and Papua New Guinea in 1993, Chile in 1994, 
then Peru, Russia and Vietnam in 1995.  
9 The acronyms refer to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); the East Asia Economic 
Caucus (EAEC), which adds Japan, China and South Korea to ASEAN; the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) and the North American Free Tree Agreement (NAFTA). 
10 The detail of these debates is beyond the scope of this paper. Ostry (1998) argues that the key issue 
for Asian states was the threat to sovereignty; while for Western economies it was fear of free-riding by 
the European Union. 
11 APEC incorporated three scales of governance. The diplomatic performances of leaders’ meetings 
respected the leaderless, non-hierarchical, non-binding and consensus-based organisational model 
preferred by ASEAN members (Plummer, 1998). The ‘Eminent Person’s Group’ that produced APEC’s 
vision of “openness, diversity and cohesion” was the repository of forces advocating rule-based multi-
lateral trade reform. Finally, the numerous technical committees set up under APEC’s auspices (but 
mainly funded by Japan) pursued detailed matters of economic integration and transaction cost 
minimisation. 
12 Berger (1999) suggests that after the financial crisis the United States could pursue its interests via 
the more authoritative instrument of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
13 Ironically, these conservative social policies echoed the austere ‘Asian values’ that the ‘western’ 
vision of APEC had sought to replace with market processes (see Robison, 1996). 
14 By value, ETM exports fell by 0.5% in 2001-02, 7% in 2002-03 and 4% in 2003-04 (Lundy, 2005). 
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